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REGULATION OF FINANCE CHARGES ON 
CONSUMER INSTALMENT CREDIT 
Robert W. Johnson* 
T HE subject of adequate disclosure of finance charges in consumer credit transactions has, in recent years, "become a rallying point 
for consumers and a battle line for industry."1 Equal heat is gener-
ated by discussions concerning the regulation of finance charges on 
consumer instalment credit. The aim of this article is to examine 
briefly the existing pattern of rate regulation and then to explore the 
purposes of ceilings on consumer finance charges and the problems 
involved in their design. As is true with the question of disclosure of 
finance charges, the problems are extremely complex. Men of good 
will on both sides of the argument will disagree, but if the economic 
rationale is clearly understood, the philosophical grounds for dis-
agreement may become more sharply defined.2 
I. EXISTING RATE CEILINGS ON CONSUMER INSTALMENT CREDIT 
Those states with the most comprehensive schemes for regulation 
of consumer credit set different maximum rates for each recognized 
form of instalment credit. The types of instalment credit can be 
divided into ·two general categories with much diversity within 
each category: (I) instalment loans by pawnbrokers, licensed lenders, 
credit unions, industrial loan companies, savings and loan associa-
tions, and commercial banks-as well as certain revolving cash 
credit plans; (2) instalment sales of various consumer goods, particu-
larly new and used automobiles-as well as revolving sales credit 
• Professor of Industrial Administration, Krannert Graduate School of Industrial 
Administration, Purdue University. 1939-1942, Oberlin College; M.B.A. 1946, Harvard 
Business School; Ph.D. 1957, Northwestern University. The author has served since 
1964- as Associate Reporter-Economist and as Economic Consultant to the Consumer 
Credit Project of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. 
The opinions expressed in this article are his own and are not intended to reflect the 
views of the National Conference or of the Special Committee on Retail Installment 
Sales, Consumer Credit, Small Loans and Usury.-Ed. 
I. Jordan &: ·warren, Disclosure of Finance Charges: A Rationale, 64 l\:IICH. L. REv. 
1285-322 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Jordan &: Warren]. 
2. To clarify my aims in this article, the objective is to discuss whether limitation 
on consumer finance charges is desirable, and, if so, what principles might guide the 
formulation of rate ceilings. Certain associated problems are not covered. Among 
these are the form in which any rate ceiling should be stated in legislation, the legal 
problems of applying state legislation to federally chartered credit grantors, the defini-
tion of a consumer credit transaction, the limitation of charges for delinquency, or 
for extending or refinancing outstanding debts, and limitations on finance charges in 
lease transactions that serve as alternatives to consumer instalment sales. 
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plans.3 It is perhaps not too much to say that the irreconcilable diver-
sity of rate ceilings governing the major types of consumer instalment 
credit today may, in itself, help to justify the move toward greater 
uniformity in legislation governing consumer credit. 
A. Cash Credit 
I. Small Loan Transactions 
Under the leadership of the Russell Sage Foundation, the 
Uniform Small Loan law (U.S.L.L.) was conceived and drafted in 
1916 to meet the problem of loan sharks-illegal lenders who extract 
usurious interest rates from the public-by excepting small loans 
from the prohibitions of the usury laws. Such an exception was neces-
sary because it was not economically possible for commercial lenders 
to provide instalment loans to consumers at the rates specified in the 
general interest and usury laws; thus, a vacuum was created in the 
loan market which loan sharks rushed to fill. Under the U.S.L.L., 
lenders licensed by the state were permitted to charge higher, or 
augmented, rates on loans below a given amount on the condition 
that they adhered to various stringent regulations designed to prevent 
abuse of borrowers.4 Today, all of the states except Arkansas and the 
District of Columbia "have laws which permit cash lending by finance 
companies at rates which would attract responsible capital."5 The 
majority of these laws are patterned after the U.S.L.L., and most 
specify a rate ceiling that declines as the amount of credit granted 
increases. 6 
3. A good summary description of various consumer credit institutions may be found 
in M. NEIFELD, MANUAL ON CONSUMER CREDIT 311-464 (1961). 
4. See generally, D. GALLERT, W. HILBORN 8: G. MAY, SMALL LOAN u:G!Sl.ATION 
(1932); F. HUBACHEK, ANNOTATIONS ON SMALL LOAN LAws (1938); L. ROBINSON 8: R. 
NUGENT, REGULATION OF THE SMALL LOAN BUSINESS (1935). 
5. NATIONAL CONSUMER Ass'N, 1967 FINANCE FACTS YEARBOOK 51. 
6. Section 13(a) of the Seventh Draft of the UNIFORM SMALL LOAN LAW (U.S.L.L.) 
(1942) provides: 
Every licensee hereunder may contract for and receive, on any loan of money not 
exceeding $300 in amount, charges at a rate not exceeding 3 per cent a month 
on that part of the unpaid principal balance of any loan not in excess of $100, 
and 2 per cent a month on any remainder of such unpaid principal balance. 
R. BARRETT, COMPILATION OF CONSUMER FINANCE LAws 681 (1952). As some states raised 
the size of loan ceiling under the U.S.L.L., there has been a tendency to more gradations 
in the rate ceiling. For example, in Iowa licensed lenders are permitted to levy a 
monthly charge of 3% on the first $150 of declining outstanding principal balance, 2% 
on the unpaid balance from $150.01 to $300; 1½% on the balance from $300.01 to 
$700; and 1% on the balance above $700 to the ceiling of $1,000. As noted in Jordan 8: 
Warren 1286-89, some states permit these charges to be precomputed; that is, the 
finance charge applicable over the life of the loan is calculated at the time credit is 
granted on the assumption that the loan will be repaid according to the contract. To 
appraise these rates, it is important to recognize that each rate applies only to the 
specified portion of the unpaid monthly balance. Thus, as a loan for $1,000 is repaid 
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The maximum finance charge permitted licensed lenders varies 
greatly among the states. For example, on a $500 cash advance repay-
able in twelve monthly instalments, Alaska permits a finance charge 
of $129.76, while New York limits the charge to $64.72. The median 
charge among the states is $81.52.7 These dollar amounts convert into 
nominal annual rates to maturity of 44.9%, 23.0%, and 28.8% 
respectively. 8 Of course, under the customary graduated rate ceil-
ings, the authorized rates would be somewhat higher on smaller 
loans and lower on larger loans. In addition, a number of states 
have ancillary acts under which licensed lenders may make larger 
loans than permitted under the small loan law, but at rates that are 
typically below the ceiling rates in the small loan statutes.9 
The Seventh Draft of the U.S.L.L. provides that "in addition to 
monthly, the l % rate applies only while the outstanding balance exceeds $700, and 
then only to that portion of the unpaid balance above $700. The 3, 2, and 1½% rates 
apply to their respective portions of the balance below $700. Consequently, the annual 
yield on loans under a graduated rate is not twelve times the simple average of the 
monthly rates weighted by the portion of the loan to which they apply. To determine 
the annual rate permited by the ceiling requires laborious calculations, a computer, 
or rather complex formulas. For the formulas, see Stelson, Graduated Interest Rates in 
Small Loans, 69 AM. MATHEMATICAL MONTIILY 15-21 (1962). 
Other states have rate ceilings expressed as dollar add-on rates; that is, the ceiling 
rates are based on dollars per $100 per year of the initial unpaid balance, rather 
than the declining unpaid balance, as in the case of per-cent-per-month ceilings. 
For example, licensed lenders in Ohio are permitted add-on rates of $16-$9-$7 per year 
at $500 and $1,000 to a ceiling of $2,000. Since add-on rates apply to the initial unpaid 
balance, the average add-on rate can be approximated by an average of the add-on 
rates weighted by the portions of the loan to which they apply. Thus under the Ohio 
rate ceiling a one-year loan for $1,500 could have an average add-on rate of $10.67 















Weighted average add-on rates: $160/$1500 == $10.67 /$rnO/year. Since small loans are 
frequently refinanced, the actual yields will depend upon the methods of refunding 
the unpaid portion of the finance charge and the time of refinancing. 
7. The source for these figures is an unpublished 1967 table prepared by a major 
consumer finance company. 
8. The nominal annual rate is defined as twelve times the monthly rate. This is 
the most common method of converting a monthly rate to an annual rate. However, 
some argue that a monthly rate should be compounded monthly to determine the 
annual rate. The former procedure is advocated by M. NEIFELD, GUIDE TO INSTALMENT 
COMPUTATIONS 146, 315-20 (1953). The latter procedure is supported by M. AYRES, IN-
STALMENT MATHEMATICS HANDBOOK 212-14, 233-35 (1946), and at one time was sanc-
tioned by the FEDERAL TRADE Co:MMISSION, REPORT ON MOTOR VEHICLE INDUSTRY 955-56 
(1939). One per cent per month compounded monthly would equal 12.68 per cent per 
annum. 
9. E.g., CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 22000-653 (West 1955); Mn. ANN. CODE art. 11, §§ 163-203 
(1957). 
84 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 66:81 
the charges herein provided for, no further or other amount what-
soever shall be directly or indirectly charged, contracted for, or 
received."10 All states, save two,11 have made exceptions to this prin-
ciple in enacting their own small loan laws; the most common excep-
tions are various filing and recording fees, delinquency and deferral 
charges-especially when finance charges have been precomputed-
and various forms of credit insurance.12 Some states also authorize, 
within limits, certain additional service charges. The effect of these 
latter amendments is to raise the ceiling rate, while preserving the 
inverse relationship between rate and size of loan. 
2. Credit Union Loans 
Credit union laws also had their origin in the early part of the 
twentieth century, with the first such law being passed in Massachu-
setts in 1909.13 Like the small loan laws, credit union laws provided 
an exception to the usury laws in order to permit operations of legal 
lenders. As in many small loan statutes, rate ceilings for credit unions 
are expressed as a given per cent per month on the declining monthly 
unpaid balance. However, unlike most rate ceilings on small loans, 
ceilings on credit union loans are usually constant, regardless of the 
amount or term of the loan. Federal credit unions must limit thefr 
finance charges to 1 % per month-a nominal annual rate of 
12%,14 With a few exceptions15 this is also the rate ceiling for state-
chartered credit unions. 
In addition to the finance charge, federal credit unions may re-
quire the borrower to pay for the cost of releasing a mortgage or lien 
on the collateral property, insuring the property against casualty loss, 
and restoring clear title to the borrower.16 Some state laws also 
permit specified additional charges.17 
3. Industrial and Commercial Bank Loans 
Industrial banks were originally established as Morris Plan banks 
in 1910 to make loans to consumers against hypothecated deposits, 
10. R. BARREIT, supra note 6, at 681. 
11. Virginia and Wisconsin are the two states without exceptions. 
12. See B. CURRAN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION 25-29 (1965) [hereinafter 
cited as CURRAN). This excellent work is a convenient aid in researching existing legisla-
tion as of 1965 and will be used in this article to cite compilations of state statutes. 
13. Ch. 419 [1909] Mass. Acts now MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 419. 
14. Federal Credit Union Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1757 (1964). Unlike consumer finance 
companies, credit unions may obtain either a federal or state charter. 
15. E.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 2006 (1966) (10% per year); w. VA. CODE ANN. 
31-10-16 (1966) (1.5% per month). 
16. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, &: WELFARE, CREDIT MANUAL FOR CREDIT UNIONS 
39 (1964). 
17. See CURRAN 49 nn.331-35. 
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but now they are often difficult to distinguish from commercial banks. 
The serious entry of commercial banks into the consumer credit 
market is usually dated at 1928, when the National City Bank of New 
York first offered cash loans to consumers,18 although other banks had 
previously done some experimenting with personal loans. The effect 
of laws governing the consumer loan activities of both types of banks 
has been to permit yet another exception to existing usury statutes. 
Somewhat more than half the states permit industrial banks or indus-
trial loan companies19 to make consumer cash loans, usually with rate 
ceilings, and about four-fifths of the states have instalment loan laws 
applicable to commercial banks.20 
Rate ceilings governing cash loans made by industrial and com-
mercial banks are such a mixed bag that it is difficult to generalize. 21 
The heritage of commercial lending led to rate ceilings expressed as 
discount rates. Under this procedure, banks are permitted to deduct 
the finance charge from the face amount of the note at the time of 
the loan.22 In contrast to the graduated rate ceilings discussed above, 
a rate ceiling expressed as a discount rate permits effective rates that 
rise as maturities lengthen,23 since the longer the term of the loan, the 
greater the amount that will be pre-deducted from the face amount, 
and the lesser the amount that the lender must make immediately 
available to the borrower. Since long maturities are associated with 
18. For a capsule recount of the growth of consumer lending by commercial banks, 
see AMERICAN BANKER'S Ass'N, THE COMMERCIAL BANKING INDUSTRY 163-69 (1962). 
19. There is no essential difference between an "industrial bank" and an "industrial 
loan company" other than the right to use the word "bank" in the corporate name. 
20. CURRAN 54-55, 68. 
21. See CURRAN 52-57, 66-74, 204-19, 226-43. 
22. Rate ceilings expressed as add-on or discount rates have quite different effects; 
cf. note 6 supra. Add-on rate ceilings limit the amount of the finance charge that may 
be added to the principal balance. If the permited add-on finance charge is $7 per $100 
of initial principal balance per year, a lender may add to the principal balance of a 
two-year loan for $1,000 a finance charge of $140 (S7 x 10 x 2). The total obligation 
of the consumer is then $1,140 and his proceeds, $1,000. 
If the rate ceiling is expressed as a discount rate, say $7 per $100 of initial principal 
balance per year, discount, or 7% per year, discount, a lender can deduct the 
$140 finance charge from the face of the two-year $1,000 loan, leaving the borrower 
with net proceeds of only $860. Thus one difference betlveen add-on and discount 
rates is that the same rate provides a higher annual yield to the credit grantor if he 
is allowed to discount the finance charge, rather than add the charge to the principal. 
23. As maturities lengthen, the nominal annual yield under the add-on rate ceiling 
rises and then falls, where as the yield under a discount rate ceiling constantly rises. 
This phenomenon is summarized in the table below showing the nominal annual rates 
for various maturities under add-on and discount rate ceilings of $7 per $100 of initial 
unpaid balance per year (or 7% per annum on initial unpaid balance): 
Add-on rate yield (%) 
Discount rate yield (%) 
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large loans, the result is a rate ceiling that increases with the size of 
loan. For this reason, some rate ceilings using a discount rate are 
often coupled with a limitation on maturity of loan. 
The most common rate ceilings on instalment loans by industrial 
and commercial banks vary from 6% to 8% per annum discounted 
from the face of the note. These figures translate into an actual yield 
that ranges from about 11.6% on twelve-month loans to 18.8% on 
thirty-six-month loans. 
Statutes regulating loans by industrial and commercial banks also 
differ from those limiting rates on loans by licensed lenders and credit 
unions in that they more frequently permit additional charges 
for making and servicing a loan. Sometimes minimum charges are 
allowed. The effect of permitting such charges is, of course, to raise 
the rate ceiling on small loans. In some states the rate ceiling on small 
loans with short maturities by commercial banks is higher than that 
permitted licensed lenders on corresponding loans. When minimum 
charges are coupled with a rate ceiling expressed as a discount rate, 
the rate ceiling in relation to size of loan becomes a "lazy-]" shaped 
curve, dropping quite sharply as one goes from very small to medium-
sized loans, and then gradually moving upward for large loans with 
long maturities. 
4. Home Improvement Loans 
Home improvement loans insured under title I of the National 
Housing Act24 are also subject to rate ceilings. Present maximum 
charges are $5 per $100 per year of unpaid principal balance on the 
first $2,500 and $4 per $100 per year on the balance above $2,500. 
Although the charges may be discounted, the maximum yield may 
not exceed that available on twelve-month contracts.25 The effect of 
this language is to limit the available finance charge to a nominal 
annual rate of just under 10% on twelve-month contracts for 
less than $2,500, with slightly lower ceilings prevailing on longer 
term contracts. On contracts above $2,500, the rate ceiling falls 
farther below 10%, the larger the unpaid balance and the longer 
the maturity. Permitted fees include recording and filing fees, 
stamp taxes, title examination charges, and premiums for property 
insurance, if any, required for security for the loan.26 
24. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1702-06(d) (1964). 
25. 12 U.S.C. § I703(b) (1964). 
26. See CURRAN 63. 
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5. Check-Credit Loans 
87 
Check-credit plans are a procedure whereby an individual may 
draw against a pre-established line of credit at his commercial bank 
by simply writing checks. He is, of course, then obligated to com-
mence prescribed monthly payments to reduce his debt. Since these 
plans are relatively recent innovations, most are governed by the 
appropriate instalment loan laws or the usury laws. The four states 
which have passed legislation dealing specifically with check credit 
plans27 place rate ceilings of 1 % per month on the outstanding 
balance (a nominal annual rate of 12%) plus a fee of 25¢ per 
check. Various methods are provided for determining the outstanding 
balance. The effect of the 25¢ fee is to provide a yield slightly 
over 12%, but the effect is minimal except when a borrower writes 
a large number of small checks. 
B. Sales Credit 
In contrast to cash credit, instalment sales credit was considered 
immune from rate ceilings for a considerable number of years under 
the time-price doctrine.28 Conceived in an era when sales "on time" 
were viewed as more appropriate for the purchase of luxuries than 
necessities, the doctrine is based on the premise that a seller of goods 
or services actually may have two prices at which he is willing to sell: 
a cash price and a time price. Arguably, since he is free to set the 
cash price, he is equally free to set the time price. Thus, the differ-
ential between the two freely-set prices is not interest, but a time-
price differential. Whatever its legal foundation, the time-price 
doctrine has provided still another de facto exemption from the 
usury laws. 
I. Retail Instalment Sales 
Retail instalment sales acts are of comparatively recent vintage; 
they first appeared in the 1940's and spread rapidly throughout the 
1950's. At present, thirty-five states regulate finance charges on the 
instalment sale of motor vehicles, and about twenty-six restrict charges 
on the sale of goods other than automobiles.29 The statutes, in terms, 
27. Arizona, New Jersey, New York, and Virginia. See CURRAN 76-79. 
28. See Berger, Usury in Instalment Sales, 2 LAw &: CONTEMP. PROB. 148-72 (1935); 
Britton &: Ulrich, The Illinois Retail Instalment Sales Act-Historical Background and 
Comparative Legislation, 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 137, 143 (1958); Warren, Regulation of 
Finance Charges in Retail Instalment Sales, 68 YALE L.J. 839, 841-51 (1959). 
29. CURRAN 83-84, 101-07, 256-77. To Miss Curran's compilation should be added 
Georgia, Nebraska, and Texas (motor vehicles) and Georgia, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
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may apply only to motor vehicles, only to other goods, or to "all 
goods." 
Most retail instalment sales acts provide for rate ceilings that 
decline as the amount of credit granted increases. This declining 
ceiling is a product of several features. First, a number of statutes 
provide for minimum charges, which, of course, raise the gross yield 
on small transactions. Second, the majority of "all-good acts" specifi-
cally provide for a graduated rate ceiling, such as the New York 
statute which provides for an add-on rate of $10 per $100 per year 
on the first $500 of unpaid principal balance and $8 per $100 per 
year on the balance in excess of $500.30 In addition, most "motor 
vehicle acts" provide for a lower rate on newer cars, with the result 
that instalment contracts written on older used cars, with low unpaid 
balances, carry a higher rate than new car contracts. For example, in 
New York the ceiling add-on rate on cars over two years old is $13 
per $100 per year, while the add-on rate on a new car is $7 per $100 
per year.31 Thus if a New York consumer finances a $300 unpaid 
balance on a refrigerator for one year, the highest legal finance charge 
is $30 ($10 X 3 X 1 ), but the ceiling charge on the same unpaid 
balance on a used car is $39 ($13 X 3 X 1). It may be seen, then, 
that, depending on the item financed, the effective annual ceiling 
rate may vary from 18% to 23%. Even greater variations can be found 
in other states; seldom are rate ceilings in a given state the same for 
motor vehicles and other goods. 
2. Revolving Credit 
The more recent origin of revolving retail credit plans probably 
explains the relatively small number of states that limit finance 
charges in this area.32 The most common rate permitted is 1.5% per 
month on the unpaid balance, although various methods of deter-
mining the unpaid balance are allowed. The charge of 1.5% per 
month is not equivalent to an annual rate of 18%, as one might sup-
pose. 33 Some state laws provide for a graduated revolving credit rate, 
so that larger balances carry lower rates. 
Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Texas (goods 
other than motor vehicles). 
30. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 404(1) (McKinney 1962). 
31. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAw § 303(1) (McKinney 1962). 
32. Miss Curran lists eleven states which, under some denomination, refer to revolv-
ing credit in their more inclusive instalment vendor's acts, CURRAN 93 n.46. 
33. Since the customer's pattern of purchases and payments will not typically fall 
into a precise monthly cycle, it is apparent that he may be getting more or less than a 
month's credit in return for the I½% charge. For a fuller exploration, see Jordan 8: 
Warren 1306-07. 
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C. General Conclusions 
A few general conclusions may be drawn from this somewhat 
sketchy review of existing rate ceilings. First, all of the ceilings dis-
cussed represent an exception to existing interest and usury laws, 
except in those few states where no general usury statutes exist. 
These exceptions are necessary to permit legitimate firms to provide 
consumer instalment credit. Second, with some important exceptions, 
rate ceilings decline as the amount of credit granted increases. Since 
large amounts of credit are typically associated with long maturities, 
it may be concluded that rate ceilings often vary inversely with both 
the amount of credit and maturity of contract. Third, it should be 
evident that when a consumer seeks to use a given dollar amount of 
consumer instalment credit, he is subject to a wide variety of rate 
ceilings, depending upon the applicable state law, his source of credit, 
and, in some cases, the consumer good or service that he wishes to 
acquire. In part, these variations have arisen because different types 
of consumer credit were introduced at different times by various 
types of credit grantors. If anything, the brevity of this review has 
obscured the extent of the variety, or possibly chaos, of existing rate 
ceilings. To develop sound legislation in this area we will need to 
examine the purpose of rate ceilings and the economic principles 
that should guide their design. 
II. PURPOSE OF RATE CEILINGS 
Except in time of war, our economy is relatively free of price con-
trols. Consumers bid with their dollars for various goods and services, 
and resources are shifted to those industries producing the goods and 
services desired by consumers. The interaction of free choice by con-
sumers and free competition among suppliers meeting the expressed 
desires of consumers sets the prices for the end products. Through 
the price mechanism, goods and services are rationed among con-
sumers and, if the markets are perfect, each consumer receives an 
assortment of goods and services that is optimal from his point of 
view within the constraints of his budget. Of course, it ~s recognized 
that no market is perfect.34 We have relatively perfect competition 
34, A perfectly competitive market must have all of the following characteristics: 
(1) A commodity or service whose uniform type and quality ls recognized by 
buyers and sellers; 
(2) a large number of buyers and sellers, making offers to buy and sell inde-
pendently; 
(3) buyers and sellers who are fully informed as to prices; and 
(4) buyers and sellers who are free to enter or to leave the market. 
The perfect market is a limiting case found only in theory. Consequently, all 
markets are imperfect to some extent. Discussions of the nature of competition in con• 
sumer credit may be found in Dauer, The Nature of Competition in Consumer Credit, 
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in the grain markets because of the existence of standard grades, 
sophisticated buyers and sellers, and widely published prices. How-
ever, the market for most consumer goods and services is not charac-
terized by standard grades and uniform prices. Suppliers often prefer 
to rely on consumer brand preference and other forms of nonprice 
competition, rather than to compete solely on the basis of price. 
There is no reason why this should not be so. Consumers benefit 
from product development and other forms of nonprice competition. 
Our laws are designed, not to enforce price competition, but to en-
courage competition per se. 
In spite of these imperfections, the rule accepted in most mar-
kets is caveat emptor. I£ a consumer pays $500 for a television set 
that is "worth" only $300, there is no law, absent some proof of fraud, 
that requires a refund of the difference or that levies a penalty on 
the merchant. The individual consumer pays the penalty for his ig-
norance, carelessness, or greed. While particular consumers may 
suffer, imposition of general price controls is shunned in the belief 
that the general welfare would be damaged in the attempt to remedy 
individual cases of bad judgment. This belief is well founded. If 
price controls result in different prices than would have prevailed 
in a freely competitive market, it follows that the resulting alloca-
tion of goods and services is suboptimal. While some individual con-
sumers benefit, among consumers in general there is a net disad-
vantage because of the distortion of free choice by the imposed price 
mechanism. 
The imposition of rate ceilings on consumer credit is clearly a 
form of price control. There are nvo possible economic rationales 
for this governmental interference in an economic system that is 
generally thought to operate most efficiently without price controls. 
First, it may be thought that the consumer credit market is so imper-
fect that consumers seldom pay a "fair" price for their use of credit. 
If this is so, the government may be obliged to define and enforce 
prices that are "fair" to consumers. Second, within each given credit 
market, suppliers of credit may have monopoly power, so that even 
with perfect knowledge consumers may be overcharged for their use 
of credit. If consumer credit is best dispensed through monopolies, 
government should set prices that will both provide adequate service 
to the consumer and a "fair" return to credit grantors, just as it at-
1958 PROCEEDINGS, NATIONAL CONSUMER CREDIT CONFERENCE 18-30; Phelps, Monopolistic 
and Imperfect Competition in Consumer Loans, 8 J. OF MARKETING 382-93 (1944); 
Yntema, The Market for Consumer Credit: A Case in Imperfect Competition, 196 
ANNALS OF THE AM. ACADEMY OF POL, 8: SOCIAL SCI. 79-85 (1938). 
November 1967] Regulation of Finance Charges 91 
tempts to do in the case of public utilities. Let us examine the eco-
nomic rationale underlying these two objectives of price control in 
consumer credit. 
A. A "Fair' Price for Consumer Credit 
The assertion that price controls are needed to counteract the 
effects of an imperfect market must be based upon the following 
premises: 
I. There is a notable lack of knowledge on the part of con-
sumers, coupled with an ability on the part of suppliers successfully 
to differentiate their goods or services. 
2. These imperfections cannot be mitigated significantly by pro-
viding more information to consumers. 
3. Price controls will on balance improve the allocation of 
goods and services sufficiently to overcome the misallocation of re-
sources inherent in the design and enforcement of price ceilings. 
I. An Imperfect Market 
The market for consumer credit has often been characterized as 
an imperfect market, because consumers do not have perfect knowl-
edge about the credit services they acquire and because credit gran-
tors differentiate their services.35 Several studies have shown that 
consumers are not aware of the annual percentage rate that they 
pay on various instalment credit transactions.36 However, the ab-
sence of specific knowledge of annual rates does not necessarily mean 
that consumers are unaware that some sources of credit are less· ex-
pensive than others and that it is more costly to borrow small amounts 
than large amounts.37 In addition to lack of perfect knowledge by 
consumers, imperfections may be attributed to differentiation among 
credit grantors in such matters as credit terms, type of collateral 
required, leniency of credit policy, collection policy, amount of 
credit granted, and convenience and status of the credit grantor. 
In spite of these forms of nonprice competition in the market for 
consumer instalment credit, there is considerable evidence that fi-
nance charges are influenced by price competition, so that they are 
forced below existing rate ceilings in many instances. Data provided 
35. Phelps, supra note 34; Yntema, supra note 34. 
36. F. JUSTER&: R. SHAY, CONSUMER SENSITIVITY TO FINANCE RATES: AN EMPIRICAL AND 
ANALYTICAL INVESTIGATION 47-75 (1964); W. l\IORS, CONSUMER CREDIT FINANCE CHARGES 
80-91 (1965); Due, Consumer Knowledge of Instalment Credit Charges, 20 J. OF 
MARKETING 162-66 (1955). 
37. See testimony of George Katona in Hearings on S. 2755 Before a Subcomm. of 
the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 806-07 (1960). 
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the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
by two large sales finance companies on new-car contracts purchased 
during November 1965, reveal that rates paid by consumers were 
almost always below the rate ceiling, except in Michigan and Penn-
sylvania where rate ceilings were abnormally low.38 Even in these 
two states, where contract rates were most frequently at the ceiling, 
we cannot be sure that lower finance rates were not offset in part by 
slightly higher prices of the new car or lower values on trade-ins. An 
earlier study of new-car finance rates shows that the rates in non-
ceiling states averaged 10.95% per annum, compared to an average 
of 10.86% in all states, with some ceiling states having average rates 
above the 10.95% average figure.39 
Other studies also indicate that competition operates as a fairly 
effective check on finance charges for most types of consumer instal-
ment credit.40 The major exception is cash loans made by consumer 
finance companies. Except in one or two states, finance charges on 
most short-term cash loans by licensed lenders appear to be at the 
ceiling rates.41 Actual finance charges on used cars are probably at the 
ceiling more often than in the case of new cars, although there is no 
reliable evidence to support this assertion. Since in both of these 
particular markets, the consumer is frequently a marginal credit 
38. The data may be more clearly shown in tabular form: 
COMPARISON OF RATES CHARGED ON NEW-CAR CONTRACTS AND CEILING 
RATES NOVEMBER 1965 
Rate ceilings expressed as an add-on 






a Mich., Pa. 
Percentage of contracts in which con-





b Conn., Del., Kan., Me., Miss., Mo., Mont., N.H., N.J., N.Y., N.D., Vt., "Wis. 
c Ariz., Colo., Fla., Ind., Mass., Minn., N. M., Ore. 
d Ky., Md., Neb. 
e The method of calculation slightly overstates the percentage of contracts at 
the ceiling rate, because it was assumed that where rates fell within a stated bracket, 
all rates were at the top rate shown for the bracket. 
Source: Confidential data representing over 20,000 contracts. 
39. R. SHAY, NEW-AUTOMOBILE FINANCE RATES 1924-1962, 9-12 (1963). 
40. Schweiger 8e McGee, Chicago Banking, 34 J. OF Bus. 203, 255-70 (1961). The 
greatest amount of research in this area has been done by Allen F. Jung. See Jung, 
Charges for Appliance and Automobile Instalment Credit in Major Cities, 35 J. OF 
Bus. 386-91 (1962); Jung, Commercial Bank Charges in New York and Ontario, 3 NAT'L 
BANKING REV. 397-408 (1965); Jung, Dealer Pricing Practices and Finance Charges for 
New Mobile Homes, 36 J. OF Bus. 430 (1960); Jung, Terms on Home Improvement 
Loans, 2 Nat'l Banking Rev. 51-60 (1964). 
41. NATIONAL CONSUJIIER FINANCE Ass'N, THE CoNSUMER FINANCE INDUSTRY 62-3 (1962). 
Interviews with officers of major consumer finance companies indicate that in one or 
two high ceiling states not all lenders charge the ceiling rates. 
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risk, it is not unreasonable to hypothesize that the ceilings set 
the rates. This is not to say that there is no competition when all 
the consumer finance companies in a given state charge the same rate 
on each size and maturity of loan, but that it must then center on 
obtaining customers who qualify for that rate through various forms 
of nonprice competition, such as prompt service and flexible terms. 
2. Possible Improvements in Quality of Market 
Consumer groups view failure to disclose the annual rate of fi-
nance charge as a key factor contributing to consumers' lack of 
knowledge in the market. However, while advocating disclosure, they 
have not coupled this proposal with a suggestion that rate ceilings 
could then be removed. It seems apparent that a time-rate form of 
disclosure of finance charges would probably reduce imperfections 
in the market, although it would not provide the panacea which 
seems to be anticipated by some consumer groups. Because time-rate 
disclosure seems well on its way, the discussion here and in part III 
relating to the design of rate ceilings is based on the assumption that 
some form of time-rate disclosure will accompany the institution of 
any rate ceiling.42 Additional improvement in the market should 
follow from other suggested changes, designed to provide more com-
plete information to consumers. For example, provisions for a fuller 
disclosure of total finance charges or the total time price in ad-
vertising should assist consumers in shopping for credit. Finally, 
various programs for the education of consumers offer potential for 
the greatest long-run improvement in the market. 
42. By inserting a new chapter 255D into the General Laws of Massachusetts in 
1966, the Massachusetts legislature required disclosure of annual rate of charge in all 
retail instalment sales agreements. The formula provided to calculate the annual 
percentage rate increasingly overstates the actual rate as the maturity of contract 
lengthens. Annual rates on irregular contracts are calculated on the pretense that 
they are regular. See Driver, The New Massachusetts Retail Instalment Sales Act, 20 
PERSONAL FINANCE L.Q. REP. 110-14 (1966). 
Department of Defense Directive No. 1344.7 of May 2, 1966, provides that banks 
and credit unions with offices on military bases and other credit grantors wishing to 
obtain collection assistance must disclose the "finance charges expressed in approximate 
annual percentage rate." The conversion table accompanying the directive converts the 
dollar finance charge, as defined in the directive, to a fairly close approximation of the 
actuarial rate; that is, the rate determined by application of the "United States Rule," 
under which periodic payments are applied first to interest due with the remainder 
going to the reduction of the principal. The problem of disclosing annual rates on 
irregular contracts is met by .prohibiting irregular contracts. 
These approaches to disclosure of finance charges developed after the Jordan & 
,varren article, and present disclosure of the finance charge in terms of an annual 
percentage rate, rather than in terms of dollars per $100 of initial unpaid balance per 
year, as suggested by Jordan & Warren. The dollar add-on method of rate disclosure 
is also provided in the current draft of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code. Either 
approach provides a common unit for measuring the time rate. 
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3. Residual Imperfections 
Even if the present market for consumer instalment credit is not 
highly imperfect, and even if improvements can be made by such 
means as providing for time-rate disclosure of the finance charge, 
imperfections in the market will inevitably remain. These will result 
from "irrational" behavior by consumers and from the continuance 
of nonprice competition by suppliers of credit. The question posed, 
then, is whether rate ceilings can eliminate or alleviate these im-
perfections, which are manifest in those cases in which consumers 
pay "unfair" prices for credit. 
The task of providing "fair" prices to all consumers should not be 
underestimated. Assume that the regulatory authority wishes to pro-
duce a perfect market. Would all consumers then pay the same price 
1 for a given dollar amount and maturity of credit? This is obviously 
not the case. As noted above, credit service is not homogeneous. But 
more important, all consumers are not the same either. Some have 
excellent credit standing; others do not. Consequently, even if credit 
services were somehow forced into a homogeneous mold, the rates 
would have to vary among different consumers. If the government is 
to interpose its judgment to counteract imperfections in the credit 
market, it would thus theoretically be necessary not only to vary the 
rates based on the type and duration of credit, but also to vary die 
level of charge on each transaction depending on the individual 
consumer's credit standing. Clearly, this would not be feasible. 
As a practical matter, only one maximum charge can be specified 
for the use of a given dollar amount of credit for a given period of 
time, and it must apply without regard to other subsidiary services 
provided or the credit standing of the consumer. Whatever rate is 
set must therefore be "fair' to some consumers and "unfair" to 
others. The consumers who benefit from the rate ceiling are those 
who would otherwise have paid a higher rate through ignorance or 
indifference, and whose credit standing is just sufficient to permit 
them to obtain service at the ceiling rate. Other consumers are shut 
out of the legal market, because their credit standing is not good 
enough to enable them to obtain credit at the ceiling rate. As to a 
third group of consumers, whose credit standing would be good 
enough in a free market to obtain credit at well below the ceiling 
rate, some may pay the ceiling rate, when such a rate is established, 
because of lack of knowledge or skill in shopping. They will be pay-
ing a rate that is "unfair" in view of their credit standing, just as 
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they will pay a price that is "unfair" if they do not shop carefully 
for a new radio. Others in this third group will shop for their credit 
and presumably obtain a "fair" rate which is below that set by the 
ceiling; the ceiling as such has little direct effect here. Thus a uni-
form, universal ceiling protects only those consumers at the margin 
who just "deserve" the rate set by the ceiling and who might other-
wise have been charged a higher rate. Less credit-worthy consumers 
are eliminated from the legal market; more credit-worthy consumers 
are still exposed to the forces of an imperfect market. 
The real question, then, is whether consumers who pay more 
than they should for credit because of ignorance or indifference de-
serve some special protection. Since optimal rate ceilings cannot be 
set for each separate transaction for each individual consumer, the 
number of consumers that actually benefit from rate ceilings is con-
siderably less than even the group that theoretically could benefit. 
Moreover, for society as a whole, the economic cost of providing 
protection from excessive charges may outweigh the gains achieved 
by incompetent consumers. While the high costs of regulation and 
the doubtfulness of the social benefits have generally been sufficient 
to rule out the imposition of special price ceilings for most consumer 
goods and services, it is unlikely that freedom from price control 
would be politically acceptable in the field of consumer credit, in 
view of the deep-seated emotions concerning usury and "consumer 
protection." 
B. A "Fair" Return to Credit Grantors 
A second possible reason for advocating price controls arises 
when the market is supplied by only one or a very few firms. Here, 
even though a consumer might have perfect knowledge of the mar-
ket, he will nonetheless be in an unfavorable bargaining position 
relative to the supplier. In such cases, it has been the practice of the 
government to limit the prices that may be charged, or to halt the 
growth of monopoly power that would substantially lessen competi-
tion. 
When the supply of legal cash credit was more restricted than 
it is today, local credit monopolies were probably not uncommon. 
With the broad variety of cash and vendor credit now available, how-
ever, there is little evidence of any substantial monopoly element 
still existing in the consumer credit industry. A few states rigorously 
restrict the entry of licensed lenders, so that there may be cases where 
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marginal borrowers in a given market can find only one lender 
willing to service them.43 These instances must be infrequent, since 
examination of the earnings of consumer finance companies does not 
indicate the existence of monopoly profits that would follow from 
the exercise of monopoly power.44 The "remedial loan" to the 
necessitous borrower has become increasingly uncommon, but there 
are undoubtedly instances where lenders could and would exert 
monopoly power to extort significantly higher finance charges than 
permitted by existing rate ceilings. However, consumers facing this 
threat still have the alternative of obtaining credit through vendors 
or delaying their use of credit. 
Some may view the fact that most consumer finance companies 
charge the ceiling rate as evidence of monopoly power. However, as 
has been noted elsewhere, "the fact that actual rates are at the ceiling 
may be consistent either with monopolistic or competitive prac-
tices. "45 When all prices are at the ceiling in a competitive market, 
there is good reason to believe that the ceiling simply has been set 
below the equilibrium level. The imposed ceiling can and, in fact, 
does hold down prices in the legal market. However, by artificially 
limiting the supply in the legal market, the price ceiling is simul-
taneously creating an illegal market, where prices are not merely 
at what would othenvise be the equilibrium level, but are higher in 
order to cover the costs and risks of evasion of the law. 
Even if there were convincing evidence of general monopoly 
power, the task of regulating credit grantors as public utilities would 
be every bit as complex as setting "fair" prices for consumers. Cost 
structures vary materially from firm to firm within a particular 
species of credit grantor and even more widely among different types 
of credit grantors. Because of joint-cost problems, most non-special-
ized credit grantors find it very difficult to isolate costs attributable 
to consumer credit. As in the case of public utility monopolies, rate 
ceilings would have to be set for each individual credit grantor and 
for each amount and maturity of credit. There would be a greater 
variety of rate ceilings than now exists, and there would still be no 
43. It should be kept in mind that markets for consumer credit are highly localized 
on the demand side. A consumer living in Chicago does not seek credit in other cities. 
Indeed, he may not view his credit market as encompassing more than a few square 
miles. If he has a poor credit standing, his market is even more constricted. 
44. Johnson, Conclusions for Regulation, in THE CONSUMER FINANCE INDUSTRY: !TS 
CosTs AND REcuLATION 142-43 (J. Chapman &: R. Shay eds. 1967) [hereinafter cited as 
Chapman &: Shay]. 
45. Fand, Competition and Regulation in the Consumer Credit Markets, 20 PER• 
SONAL FINANCE L.Q. REP. 23 (1965). 
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assurance that consumers were paying a "fair" charge for their use 
of credit. 
In summary, the analysis suggests that the need for rate ceilings 
lies more in the realm of philosophy and politics than in economics. 
On the one hand, there are certainly cases where individual con-
sumers are better off with rate ceilings than they would be without 
them. There would undoubtedly be a higher incidence of unwary 
consumers victimized by rapacious credit grantors in the absence of 
rate ceilings. On the other hand, it is not at all clear that overall 
social welfare is maximized by having rate ceilings. While regula-
tion of prices may mitigate some problems, it introduces others. Any 
regulation involves costs for the administrative apparatus and for 
the regulated industry. The latter incurs added costs both in com-
plying with the existing rules and in trying to influence future 
changes in regulation. Regulation also tends to fragment the con-
sumer credit industry, with a consequent reduction in competition 
among different credit-granting institutions. Therefore, against the 
benefits of rate ceilings to some consumers, we must weigh the costs 
to others who may find distortions in their optimal consumption 
patterns imposed by the ceilings and by the costs of regulation per se. 
If, however, the rate ceiling is high enough, distortions in alloca-
tion of resources are minimized because the price mechanism can oper-
ate more freely and because less regulatory policing is required. Thus, 
our aim should be to establish rate ceilings which are high enough 
to allow the prices of most credit arrangements to be set by competi-
tion, but which will prevent those politically unpalatable and un-
conscionable transactions that represent the joining of an unwary 
consumer with an avaricious or relatively powerful credit grantor. 
Let us examine the basic economic principles for the formation of 
rate ceilings, so that both consumers and credit grantors can meet 
in a market unhampered by the existing hodge-podge of rate ceilings. 
Ill. DESIGN OF RATE CEILINGS 
Formulation of sound price ceilings on any good or service is 
difficult at best. Substitution of governmental fiat for the automatic 
processes of the market place in the field of consumer credit is par-
ticularly formidable because of the multiplicity of variables en-
countered: the different types of credit grantors, the size and maturity 
of credit, the associated credit services, and the credit standing of 
each debtor. While perhaps the free market place has its own injus-
tices, price ceilings are capable of creating even more. To minimize 
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this type of injustice, it is essential that the objective be to set ceilings 
rather than rates for all varieties of transactions. The purpose of this 
section is to set forth certain basic principles that might guide the 
design of general price ceilings on consumer credit in order to mini-
mize distortions of the market and the consequent misallocation of 
resources. 
A. Uniformity of Ceiling 
In formulating the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, a major 
problem has been whether rate ceilings should vary by the type of 
credit involved, the item financed, the type of credit grantor, and 
from state to state. It was shown in Part I that this sort of variety is 
characteristic of present rate ceilings. Given this problem, a discus-
sion of the level and structure of rate ceilings will be more meaning-
ful if we first determine whether it is appropriate to have one or 
many rate ceilings. 
I. Cash Credit Versus Vendor Credit 
The hallowed time-price doctrine postulating a difference in 
kind between cash and sales credit has somewhat greater economic 
merit from the viewpoint of credit grantors than of consumers. Other 
things being equal, if a cash loan is unsecured, the lender incurs 
more risk, both because of his lack of security and because his 
"money at risk" represents the entire loan. In contrast, the credit 
vendor has at risk only his cash investment in the merchandise at 
the time of sale. The vendor may even shift that risk to a third party 
by selling his instalment paper to a financial institution. However, 
a consumer receives essentially the same credit service whether he 
finances his automobile through a dealer or directly with a bank. 
In each instance he obtains an automobile, a given number of month-
dollars of credit services, and an obligation to repay the debt. 
There is one important economic difference between cash credit 
and vendor credit that should influence the design of rate ceilings. 
If legislation is properly drawn, the cash lender has no place to 
conceal his finance charge and no source of additional income for 
his credit services. In contrast, the vendor offering both a time price 
and a cash price may juggle these prices any way he chooses.46 Thus, 
46. This adjustment, however, is not made without cost either to the retailer or his 
customers. The demand for credit is derived from the demand for goods and services 
financed. Since the finance charge is a relatively small portion of the total time price 
and monthly payment, consumers are probably not as sensitive to changes in the 
price of credit as they are to changes in the cash price of the goods or services financed. 
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if rate ceilings limit the permitted finance charge, the credit mer-
chant can merely reallocate his actual total time price between the 
cash price and finance charge. The point may be illustrated by an 
extreme example. Complete prohibition of any finance charge un-
doubtedly would expel all rational legal cash lenders from the field 
of consumer credit, but would not necessarily eliminate all vendor 
credit. Some vendors would build the cost of credit into the cash 
price of their merchandise and would offer "free" credit, just as many 
credit jewelry, clothing, and furniture stores do now. At this extreme 
the market would ultimately be segmented into retailers who sold 
primarily for credit and those who sold primarily for cash, with the 
price differential between merchants representing the buried finance 
charge. Less punitive ceilings would permit retailers to continue to 
offer both a cash price, as such, and a time price. 
Low rate ceilings thus discriminate in favor of vendor credit 
and against cash credit. They also discriminate in favor of credit 
buyers in relation to cash buyers, because of the forced narrowing 
of the time-price differential. While the lack of a significant eco-
nomic distinction between cash credit and vendor credit suggests 
that rate ceilings should be the same for each type of credit, the 
ability of credit vendors to evade the full impact of a rate ceiling 
makes it important to design ceilings that themselves do not dis-
criminate against lenders in favor of vendors, or against cash buyers 
in favor of credit buyers. 
2. Closed-End Versus Open-End Credit 
The distinction here is between instalment contracts-either 
cash loans or time sales-and open-end arrangements, such as re-
volving credit, check credit, and charge-account banking. These 
two basic forms of consumer credit differ significantly in the manner 
in which credit is granted and serviced and in the procedures fol-
lowed in assessing finance charges.47 
From the standpoint of establishing rate ceilings, one basic dis-
In economic terminology, the demand for credit is probably less elastic than is the 
demand for the good or service. 
Assume that without rate ceilings a retailer has achieved his optimum market 
strategy by allocation of the total time price between the cash price and finance charge. 
An imposition of rate ceilings forces him to redistribute a portion of the finance charge 
to the cash price. Because the demand for the good is more elastic than the demand for 
credit, this shift will reduce the number of cash sales by an amount greater than any 
resultant increase in credit sales. Thus, not only are total sales likely to be less, but 
also the credit sales gained are more costly to service than the cash sales lost. The 
resultant reduction in profits will force some marginal retailers out of the market. 
47, See Jordan and Warren 1290-92. 
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tinction is that in the case of closed-end credit the finance charge 
can be determined at the inception of the contract on the assumption 
that payments will be made on schedule. Rate ceilings can then be 
set on the scheduled finance charge and upon penalties for late pay-
ments. In contrast, the finance charges on open-end credit can only 
be determined after the debt has been incurred and after payments 
have been made to reduce the debt. The debt load may vary from 
day to day and remain outstanding over several years, as in the case 
of revolving charge accounts at department stores. 
It would be possible, conceptually, to limit finance charges on 
open-end credit by requiring that after the debt has been retired, 
the finance charges incurred be based on daily unpaid balances over 
the period of indebtedness. Any amounts received in excess of a 
specified annual rate would then be refunded. The practical diffi-
culties of such an approach are evident. Further, if finance charges 
are to be limited ex ante on both closed-end and open-end credit, 
the specification of the rate ceilings must be consistent with each of 
these two basically different methods of levying the finance charge. 
A rate ceiling on closed-end credit may be stated in terms of a per 
cent per month or year or as a dollar add-on rate. The rate ceiling 
on open-end credit, however, must limit the percentage applicable 
to monthly unpaid balances, as determined by trade practice or by 
statute, and possibly provide a limited minimum charge per trans-
action (as in check credit) or per time period (as in revolving credit). 
While this degree of segmentation of rate ceilings seems unavoid-
able, it does raise problems. Many credit grantors have a choice be-
tween offering closed-end or open-end credit. For example, a de-
partment store may sell a refrigerator on either an instalment con-
tract or under its revolving credit plan. Similarly, a bank may offer 
an instalment loan or the same amount of cash under a check-credit 
plan. Obviously, the rate ceilings should be reasonably comparable 
in order not to favor one type of credit over another. But this is 
easier said than done. As pointed out by Jordan and Warren,48 under 
revolving credit plans the customer determines the actual rate that 
he will pay, whereas the credit grantor establishes only the "rules 
of the game" when he sets the monthly percentage and any minimum 
charge. Consequently, actual rate ceilings under closed-end and 
open-end credit will be identical only for hypothetical customers 
and seldom for real ones. 
On the other hand, there may be some merit in setting ceilings 
48. Id. 
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on open-end credit that on the average will be lower than rates for 
similar amounts of closed-end credit. Jordan and Warren point out 
that "it is not possible to make accurate time rate disclosure at the 
inception of the transaction" on revolving charge accounts and check-
credit plans.49 Consequently, it may be desirable to establish rate 
ceilings on closed-end and open-end credit that do not encourage 
credit grantors to employ open-end credit as a means of avoiding rate 
disclosure. 
3. Type of Credit Grantor 
While existing rate ceilings are often based upon the type of 
credit grantor, this distinction is of doubtful economic merit. Seg-
mentation of rate ceilings on this basis permits credit grantors an-
other means of product differentiation, thereby providing them 
with some degree of monopoly power. Although each might charge 
rates below their particular industry ceilings, credit grantors would 
behave as non-competing groups within the protection of this market 
segmentation. 
Even if all credit grantors operated under the same rate ceiling, 
there would be some segmentation of the market. Individual credit 
grantors tend to charge the same rates for the same credit services to 
all customers and do not attempt to vary rates according to the credit 
standing of each applicant. Thus, commercial banks tend simply to 
reject marginal risk borrowers and specialize in lending to better 
credit risks. A uniform ceiling, however, would encourage credit 
grantors to experiment with different rates of charge in order to 
penetrate new markets and to adjust to changing economic condi-
tions. This would reinforce the present trend toward diversifica-
tion, discourage customer segmentation, and bring increased com-
petition into the field as a whole. 
One possible exception to a uniform ceiling applicable to all 
credit grantors should be noted. If one group of cash lenders is 
singled out elsewhere in legislation for licensing requirements and 
other detailed regulations designed to protect a special, marginal 
risk class of consumers, these lenders should be given an augmented 
rate. This rate should be high enough to cover the added costs of 
regulation and the increased costs associated with managing a more 
risky portfolio of loans. 
Although some consumer representatives express the fear that a 
uniform rate ceiling would encourage all types of credit grantors 
49. Id. at 1305. 
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to raise their rates to the ceiling, the evidence presented in part n°0 
suggests that competitive pressure would tend to keep rates below 
a properly-designed ceiling. Indeed, even without some form of rate 
disclosure, in most types of credit, actual ra,tes are held significantly 
below the ceiling by competition. The major exceptions have been 
revolving credit, where the rate ceilings are largely set in terms of 
what is in fact the going rate, and small loans by licensed lenders. 
In the latter case, competition focuses on assuming credit risks up 
to the margin, given the ceiling rate fixed by statute. With the ad-
vent of rate disclosure, price competition is likely to be even more 
prevalent. 
4. Type of Item Financed 
It was observed in Part I that a· further segmentation of the 
market is produced by rate ceilings that are related to the type of 
item financed. Thus the rate ceiling applicable to a $600 used car 
under a motor vehicle act is likely to differ from the rate ceiling 
on the credit sale of a $600 color television set under an all goods 
act. A case might be made for differences in rates among types of 
merchandise, and rates do differ in the free market. For instance, 
other things being equal, it is more risky to finance the sale of a tele-
vision set than a used car. In case repossession is necessary, there is 
a fairly active market in used cars, but not in used home furnishings, 
It seems unlikely that any form of rate ceiling can properly take 
into account these subtle distinctions, even for existing products and 
services, let alone for yet undeveloped goods and services. Rather 
than attempt to do so, it would seem more workable to establish a 
uniform rate applicable to all goods, permitting each credit grantor 
to assess those subtle risks inherent in the goods or service financed 
and adjust his willingness to provide credit accordingly. In any 
case, the potential risk of granting credit to the particular consumer 
and the margin between costs and rate ceiling are likely to weigh 
far more heavily in the ultimate credit decision than the charac-
teristics of the good purchased. For these reasons it seems econom-
ically unsound to base rate ceilings on the type of item financed, so 
long as we assume that we are setting ceilings and not rates. 
5. State of Jurisdiction 
At the present time, as we have seen, there are substantial dif-
ferences in rate ceilings among the states. Just how great is the 
50. See note 38 supra and accompanying text. 
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economic impact of these differences, however, cannot be assessed 
without examining other aspects of the statutes that affect the costs 
of providing credit and possible additional sources of :finance income. 
For example, in addition to variations in rate ceilings, there are 
marked diversities among the states in the amounts of credit that 
may be granted by different lenders, restrictions on freedom of entry, 
debtors' and creditors' remedies, and provisions relating to credit-
associated insurance. Though the interaction of these provisions is 
difficult to measure, the net effect is a further segmentation of the 
credit market. The result is that credit capital flows from states with 
low margins between rate ceilings and costs to more generous states. 
There are economic reasons for supporting different rate ceilings 
among the states, although there is no sound evidence to suggest that 
existing variations are founded on such economic reasoning. The 
credit standing of consumers does vary widely among the states. As 
one indication of credit standing, only 12% of families in the North-
east and West had money incomes of less than $3,000 in 1965, com-
pared to 25% of the families in the South.51 If money income is a 
suitable proxy for credit standing, a national uniform rate ceiling 
would make cash credit available to a smaller portion of families in 
Southern states than in other regions. Vendor credit would be less 
affected for the reasons stated earlier in this section.52 
An attempt to set rate ceilings in relation to the credit standings 
of consumers in various states, however, would face a number of 
problems. In the :first place, the demographic differences among the 
many markets within a single state may be as great as those among 
states. Markets for consumer credit are not defined by state bound-
aries, but are much more narrowly limited geographically. In some 
areas, especially in large cities, consumers may not range more than 
a few blocks in shopping for credit. For example, the variations in 
characteristics of consumers between the Michigan cities of Ish-
peming and Detroit and among the various credit markets within 
Detroit are so great that any state-wide ceiling must represent a 
substantial compromise between the needs of high-cost and low-cost 
markets. A uniform ceiling among the several states merely presents 
the same problem, although possibly in magnified form. Certainly.-
it would be easier to establish general ceilings than to set separate 
rates to reflect the economic characteristics of the myriad markets 
for consumer credit. 
51. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CONSUMER INCOME 4 (Series P-60, No. 51, 1967). 
52. See text accompanying note 46 supra. 
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In addition, it should be recognized that any uniform rate ceiling 
-either state-wide or nation-wide-will leave pockets of high-risk 
consumers that will not be provided credit at the ceiling rate, and 
there will be more pockets in some cities and states than in others. 
A rate ceiling high enough to encompass these high-risk areas would 
probably not be tolerated by the public conscience. Moreover, the 
scarcity of cash credit in these pockets of poverty reflects much more 
fundamental economic and social problems than those associated 
with consumer credit. Rather than distort rate ceilings, it would be 
more appropriate to deal with these problems directly. In these 
circumstances if cash credit is to be provided under "reasonable" 
rate ceilings, it must be supported by some form of subsidy.u3 
B. Definition of Finance Charge 
The definition of "finance charge" is pertinent both to the dis-
closure of the charge to consumers and to the determination of the 
level of the ceiling. There is no intrinsic reason why the definition 
should be the same for each purpose, although regulation is likely 
to be easier if the definitions are identical. It should be clear that a 
proper definition of the finance charge is crucial-a faulty definition 
may facilitate evasion of the rate ceiling or unduly restrict the credit 
market. Because of the scope of the problem we can only sketch its 
broad outlines here. 
Definition of the finance charge is fairly simple if one is willing 
to adopt the approach used by the Russell Sage Foundation expressed 
in the first Uniform Small Loan Law: given the principal amount 
of credit extended to a consumer, everything else that he agreed to 
repay over and above this amount, however expressed or labelled, 
was defined as the "finance charge" (although mislabelled "interest" 
in the first draft). The rigor of this early definition reflects an attempt 
to combat the loan sharks of that era, who had devised numerous 
methods of obtaining exorbitant rates by levying additional charges 
while complying in terms with the usury statutes. 04 
The principle of such an all-inclusive charge, however, became 
less applicable as new forms of consumer credit were developed and 
new credit-associated services were provided. The growth of instal-
ment sales financing brought various forms of property insurance 
covering the goods sold, and there was general agreement that the 
53. With the aid and financial support of the Office of Economic Opportunity, 
some credit unions have been established in poverty areas to provide cash credit to the 
poor. 
54. See Nugent, The Loan Shark Problem, 8 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 3-13 (1941). 
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premiums, although paid by the borrower, were not part of the fi-
nance charge. More varied treatment was accorded filing fees and 
charges for the release of liens. Provision of life, accident, and health 
insurance for the debtor brought on a heated controversy as to 
whether the premiums on these policies were part of the finance 
charge or merely a charge for additional benefits received.55 
Whatever the definition of the finance charge, it is apparent that 
the more all-inclusive the definition, the higher must be the rate 
ceiling in order to accommodate the same group of consumers. There 
is probably considerable merit to excluding insurance premiums 
from the definition, if for no other reason than to relegate that 
complex area of supervision to state insurance commissioners. In-
surance premiums must be adjusted frequently as loss experience 
changes, and this would necessitate a change in rate ceilings if the 
cost of insurance premiums were included in the definition of the 
finance charge. As we shall see in the next two sections, regulation 
of those charges commonly defined as part of the finance charge is 
difficult enough. 
C. Level of Finance Charge 
In those rare instances in our economy when price controls ap-
pear to be justified, there is a great temptation to assume that since 
price ceilings are needed to protect consumers, even greater protec-
tion can be achieved by further lowering the ceilings. This is a gross 
misconception. 
To explore the effects of price control more fully, let us leave 
the emotionally-charged field of consumer credit and assume that 
it is thought desirable to limit the prices charged by the more mun-
dane taxi industry. If licensees are free to enter and leave the busi-
55. For representative literature see Cade, The Fundamental Issues of Consumer 
Credit Insurance, 1955 INS. LAW J. 76-93; Credit Life Insurance: Pro and Con, 1956 
PROCEEDINGS OF THIRD ANNUAL CONSUMER CREDIT CONFERENCE; Dunbar, Credit In-
surance Use by Licensed Lenders, 1956 INS. LAW J. 443-58; Mors, Consumer Installment 
Credit Insurance, 1956 INs. LAw J. 299-318. 
It might be noted that the Department of Defense Directive 373-66 of May 2, 1966, 
relating to the personal commercial affairs of military personnel defines in its dis-
closure section as finance charges those "which benefit the seller or creditor, or 
entities in which either has an interest. These are charges which woulcl not be made if 
this were a cash purchase: 
a. Official fees for filing or recording credit instrument. 
b. Charges for investigating credit worthiness of borrower. 
c. Insurance premiums (life, disability, accident, health, other). 
d. All other charges for extending credit." 
This definition represents substantially a return to the early all-inclusive definition of 
the finance charge, perhaps reflecting the suspicion that servicemen remain particularly 
susceptible to loan sharks. 
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ness, the rate ceiling will determine not only the price on the meter 
but also the level of taxi services provided consumers. A high rate 
will attract operators into the business; a low rate will discourage 
entry. If the Taxi Commissioner should seek to "protect" consumers 
by lowering the rate ceiling to ten cents a mile, he would probably 
drive most of the operators out of the business. To obtain taxi service 
consumers would be forced to deal with unlicensed taxis, or "gypsies" 
as they are sometimes called. Here, the rates would be whatever the 
market would bear, and consumers would be unprotected by in-
surance, more stringent driving tests, and other responsibilities re-
quired of licensed taxi drivers. 
Moreover, in establishing the rate ceiling, the Commissioner 
would also have to be concerned about the level of rates in relation 
to distance traveled. Thus price control places with the price setter 
the responsibility of establishing a variety of rate ceilings that are 
high enough to provide an "adequate" level of service and are so 
related to the services performed that no particular type of service is 
unduly priced out of the market. In essence, he is trying to reproduce 
the prices that would result in a perfectly competitive market. If the 
Taxi Commissioner is not uneasy in his role of playing God over 
the price system, he should be. 
The legislator who places price ceilings on consumer instalment 
credit is faced with essentially the same type of problem. Both the 
level and the slope of the rate ceiling in relation to size and maturity 
of credit will have important economic effects upon consumers and 
upon credit grantors as well. 
I. Effect Upon Consumers 
It is very common for legislators to ask for a full disclosure and 
analysis of credit grantors' costs of doing business in order that they 
may set appropriate rate ceilings. Unfortunately, this approach puts 
the cart before the horse. If capital is free to move from one industry 
to another and across state lines, a ceiling on rates determines the 
level of allowable costs, which in tum sets the permitted level of 
service. In other words, given a rate ceiling, a credit grantor must 
adjust his operations to generate sufficient profit on owners' equity. 
Higher rate ceilings permit those credit grantors lending at the mar-
gin to assume greater risks, or, in other words, to incur the higher 
costs necessarily involved in serving more marginal customers. Low-
ering of ceilings drives marginal customers from the market, and 
they either forego their use of credit or tum to illegal lenders. In 
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this manner rate ceilings determine which consumers will be served 
by the legitimate market. Consequently, the real question to ask 
in a rate hearing is what proportion of the state's consumers do we 
wish to have served by legal credit granters operating under the pro-
tective provisions of the statute. It should be remembered that 
changes in rate ceilings leave relatively undisturbed those credit 
granters and consumers doing business at below-ceiling rates. Just as 
a change in the minimum wage laws directly affects only those 
workers receiving the minimum, so does a change in rate ceilings 
directly affect only those borrowers operating at the ceiling.56 
Evidence to support the foregoing analysis of the economic effect 
of rate ceilings can best be derived from the consumer finance in-
dustry. Because licensed lenders are dealing with high-risk bor-
rowers, their rates are generally at the ceiling. In addition, unlike 
the credit vendor, they find it difficult to offset the effect of lower 
ceilings by reallocation of the finance charge to the price of the goods 
and services. Consequently, the small loan or consumer finance in-
dustry provides the clearest illustration of the effect of price ceilings 
on the size of market that can be served. In a recent study of this 
industry, there is considerable evidence supporting the theory that 
costs follow rate ceilings .. Analysis of the operating statements of 
forty-eight companies, located in different states, shows a very close 
correlation between gross income (that is, annual yield from credit 
granted) and operating costs: "[w]hen gross income per $100 of loans 
outstanding is high, operating costs per $100 of loans are high, and 
vice versa."57 The higher operating costs that follow the higher 
ceilings implicit in the higher percentage yield appear directly at-
tributable to an assumption of higher risks. Given freedom of entry 
and freedom to compete, consumer finance companies react to higher 
ceilings by turning down a smaller proportion of applicants and 
serving a larger proportion of the population. Serving more mar-
ginal customers means that companies in states with higher or more 
lenient ceilings incur greater operating costs for investigation and 
collection, as well as a higher net charge-off of bad debts. But con-
sumer finance companies in these states do not show any apparent 
improvement in profits.58 Thus costs tend to follow rate ceilings be-
56. Note also that such a rate ceiling change has a more direct and substantial 
effect on lenders, because vendors have the opportunity of transferring part of the 
finance charge to the cash price of goods and services if the rate ceiling is lowered. 
See text accompanying note 44 supra. 
57. Zwick, A Cross-Section Study of Industry Costs and Earnings in Chapman &: 
Shay 71. 
58. Shay, State Regulation and the Provision of Small Loans in Chapman &: Shay, 
104; Zwick, A Cross-Section Study of Industry Costs and Earnings in Chapman &: Shay 
77. 
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cause credit grantors operating within high ceilings undertake more 
risky portfolios. 09 
Even if we have a reasonable concept of the size of the market 
that should be served by legitimate credit grantors, it is difficult to 
measure the adequacy of existing services, just as it is difficult to 
evaluate the sufficiency of taxi service. The size of the legal market 
may be judged in part by studying the amount of consumer instal-
ment credit outstanding per person. The extent of the illegal market 
is obviously even more hazardous to measure. Reports of activities 
of "goon squads" and "juice men" dealing with consumers might 
lead one to suspect that some rate ceilings are so low that a large 
enough market of poor credit risks has been created to warrant the 
activities of illegal lenders. 
In summary, it is not possible to say precisely that a particular 
rate ceiling is too high or too low. Once we have decided that we wish 
to have rate ceilings, we have also implicitly decided to segment 
the market into "haves" and "have nots." We admit some consumers 
to the market and hope that each will shop for the best credit buy 
available. Others with a lower credit standing are denied entry to 
the legal market and to the other protections afforded by the legis-
lation. Clearly, we hope that they will postpone satisfying their needs 
until their credit standing is sufficient to gain entry. But we should 
not be surprised if some turn to the "gypsies" of the credit industry. 
Since credit grantors must maintain an adequate margin between 
revenues and costs to attract capital, it should be apparent that the 
level of credit service is as much affected by statutory provisions af-
fecting costs as by those setting rate ceilings. For example, there is 
good reason to argue that consumers may need more protection "in 
the area of creditors' remedies and effective policing by public of-
ficials .... " 60 However, to the extent that these added safeguards re-
sult in significantly higher costs to credit grantors, rate ceilings may 
have to be raised to avoid pinching off the supply of credit. Because 
of this intimate relationship between rate ceilings and costs, it should 
be apparent that the different sections of a comprehensive statute, 
such as the proposed Uniform Consumer Credit Code, are similarly 
interrelated. Thus it would be difficult to make significant changes 
in any one section without creating a need to amend several other 
sections. 
59. For added support, see GoUDZWAARI>, THE EFFECT OF RATE STRUCTURE UPON nm 
AVAILABILITY OF CREDIT AT CONSUMER FINANCE COMPANIES (Unpublished Ph.D. Disserta• 
tion, Michigan State University 1965). 
60. Jordan 8: Warren 1322. 
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Because a high proportion of the costs of granting credit are for 
services performed, rather than for the mere use of money, the costs 
of these services are likely to rise with general increases in wage rates 
and price levels. Consequently, a rate ceiling that is appropriate for 
one year may become quite inappropriate for later years. Given fixed 
rate ceilings, a prolonged rise in operating costs will progressively 
squeeze more and more consumers from the legal market as the credit 
grantors seek to maintain their profit margin by eliminating high risk 
borrowers. If rate ceilings are to be uniform among the states, it 
appears desirable, therefore, to allow for a partial increase in rate 
ceilings in relation to some price index. Such an automatic adjust-
ment appears preferable to leaving the changes to the vagaries of fifty 
different state legislatures. 
2. Effect on Industry Structure 
One general result of rate ceilings is to limit the ability of the 
particular restricted credit industry to compete for capital against 
those other types of credit grantors who may not face such ceilings. 
This effect was particularly evident in 1966, when the savings and 
loan associations and other mortgage lenders in some states found it 
difficult to compete for funds to invest in mortgages whose yields 
were unduly restricted by usury laws. 
In addition to this inter-industry effect of rate ceilings, there are 
important intra-industry effects. Lower rate ceilings force both mar-
ginal customers and marginal credit grantors from the market. This 
is particularly so in the case of cash lenders. As the rate ceiling presses 
down, the market ultimately becomes too restricted for economical 
operation, and some cash lenders must leave the market.61 The recent 
study of the consumer finance industry shows that the small com-
panies have lower net operating income ratios and notably higher 
costs of financing. Not only do they pay more for what they borrow, 
but they cannot borrow as much in relation to their net worth as 
their larger competitors.62 Consequently, low rate ceilings probably 
force out the small lenders and bring a greater concentration of the 
61. This has happened. See Nugent, Three Experiments With Small-Loan Interest 
Rates, 12 HARV. Bus. REv. 35-46 (1933). In three states, at different times the legislatures 
reduced the rate ceilings permitted licensed lenders in response to public allegations 
that rates were too high. 'When the market was so restricted that legitimate lenders 
could not operate at a profit, they withdrew their capital from the state. Illegal 
lenders flocked in and were only driven out when new legislation providing higher 
rates was passed. See also Birkhead, Murray & Lockmoeller, Illegal Lending in Missouri, 
16 Mo. L. REV. 251-73 (1951). 
62. Shay, supra note 58, at 114-18. 
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industry in the hands of the large cash lenders. Since large companies 
tend to make relatively more large loans, such concentration would 
also be likely to reduce somewhat those services available to borrow-
ers of small amounts. 
D. Slope of Rate Ceiling 
It was noted in Part I that a number of existing statutes provide 
for rate ceilings that decline as the amount of credit increases.63 Since 
large grants of credit are ordinarily accompanied by long maturities, 
it is also generally true that ceiling rates decline as maturities 
lengthen. The question is whether this is an appropriate design for 
an overall rate ceiling, or whether the ceiling should be level for all 
sizes of debt, as in the case of the rate ceiling on loans by credit 
unions. 
There is good reason to believe that credit grantors' operating 
costs do not rise in proportion to the amount of credit extended. The 
initial cost of granting credit is typically quite large in relation to 
other costs of handling the contract once it is on the books. To illus-
trate, a recent comprehensive survey of operating data of 171 com-
mercial banks shows an average acquisition cost per loan of $17.47, 
compared with an average monthly processing cost per payment of 
$.96.64 I£ one allows a return of 14% before taxes for cost of capital 
funds, these data suggest a required annual rate of about 90% on 
a $100 loan for six months, compared to a required rate of not quite 
18% on a loan of $1,000 for twenty-four months.65 This cost structure 
63. See note 6 supra and accompanying text. 
64. FUNCTIONAL COST ANALYSIS 171 BANK COMPARATIVE STUDY DEPOSITS UP TO $50 
MILLION 1964-1965, A-11. The study, undertaken by the respective Federal Reserve 
Banks, covers banks in the Boston, New York and Philadelphia districts. 
65. Consider first a loan for $100 for six months. To process the loan application, 
to investigate the credit standing of the consumer, and to set up the loan on the books 
costs the bank about $17.47-the acquisition cost. Each monthly collection costs the 
bank $0.96, or $5.76 for the six monthly payments. The acquisition cost and the 
monthly collection cost sum to $23.23, which may then be converted, on an annual 
basis, to a ratio of cost against declining unpaid balance. This annual rate, then, 
represents the yield which the lender must receive to cover these costs alone. A very 
accurate estimate of the "true" or actuarial annual rate, calculated according to the 
"United States Rule" [Story v. Livingston, 38 U.S. 359 (1839)], can be obtained by the 
direct ratio formula: 
6mD 
Yield=--------
3P(n + 1) + D(n - 1) 
in which m = the number of payments per year (if payments are monthly, m is always 
12); D = the dollar finance charge; P = principal amount of credit granted; n = 
number of payments required by the contract. Inserting the cost data in the formula, 
we have 
6 X 12 X 23.23 
Yield=---------- .7547, or 75.5% 
3 X 100(6 + 1) + 23.23(6 - 1) 
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suggests that as the size of credit increases, total costs per $100 of 
credit granted decline at a decreasing rate and eventually level off. 
Empirical evidence supports this hypothesis. The consumer fi-
nance study shows that operating costs as a percentage of loans out-
standing were lower by an average of $1.26 for each $100 increase in 
average loan balance.66 A review of the 1964 annual reports of state 
supervisors indicates that operating expense ratios per $100 of 
average loan balance outstanding ranged from 32.8% on an average 
balance of $131 to 16.2% on $400 and 11 % on $588.67 Given the 
similarity between their basic operating costs, there is no reason to 
expect a significant difference in the general nature of other credit 
grantors' costs. 
It was argued in the previous section that since costs follow 
ceilings, it is inappropriate to base the level of rate ceilings upon 
some calculation of costs. Why then is the structure of costs signifi-
cant to establishing a slope in the rate ceiling? Indeed, why not have 
a rate ceiling that is constant, regardless of the amount of credit 
granted? The answer lies in the fact that if the rate ceiling is high 
enough to provide an adequate level of credit service for small 
amounts of credit, a non-sloping ceiling would permit rates on large 
amounts of credit considerably in excess of the rate required to elicit 
a similar level of service for those amounts. For example, the annual 
rate of 36% might be thought "appropriate" (though probably inade-
quate) to finance a thirty dollar radio for ten weeks, but would be 
more than enough to cover the costs of making most cash loans of 
$2,000. Even if time-rate disclosure and rate competition would drive 
the rates actually charged well below 36% on large extensions of 
credit, the political problems of attempting to support and pass a 
rate ceiling of 36% for large amounts of credit would be staggering. 
So long as rate ceilings are viewed as a necessity, their design should 
This figure represents only the operating costs expressed as an annual percentage 
of the monthly declining unpaid balance on the loan. Nothing is yet allowed for 
interest on the money at work, corporate income taxes, or return on the owners' equity. 
An estimate of this "cost of capital" of 14% before taxes is probably a bit high for 
commercial banks and too low for other credit grantors assuming a higher risk. In any 
event, by adding the 75.5% operating cost requirement and the 14% capital cost re• 
quirement, we obtain a required rate of return on the $100, six-month loan of 89.5% 
-the minimum annual yield necessary to cover operating costs, taxes and a return on 
the funds at use. 
By similar calculations it may be shown that the operating-cost rate for a $1000, 
twenty-four-month loan is about 3.8%. With the cost of capital funds added, the total 
required yield is 17.8%. 
66. See Shay, supra note 58, at 100-01; Zwick, supra note 58, at 64. 
67. Since these ratios exclude cost of capital, they understate the total costs of 
providing credit. 
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rest both on economic principles and political realities. Consequently, 
given the demand for ceilings, a rate ceiling that slopes downward 
with size of credit extension and levels off at some point has economic 
merit, as well as being a political necessity. 
The acuteness of the problem of designing an appropriate slope 
to the rate ceiling depends in large part upon the overall level of the 
ceiling. There are two distortions in the credit market that may be 
brought about by an inappropriate slope if the overall ceiling is low. 
On the one hand, if the slope is too steep, so that rates permitted on 
small amounts of credit are quite high in relation to those permitted 
on large amounts, credit grantors will favor small extensions of credit. 
An excellent example of this result is afforded in a study by the 
Royal Commission on Banking and Finance in Canada: 68 
[I]t is striking that a very low proportion of loans is made in the 
$1,000 to $1,500 range. This is not because there is little demand 
for loans over $1,000-about one-quarter of all cash lending is in 
amounts over $1,500-but because the companies find the ½ of I 
per cent a month maximum rate allowed on balances in the $1,000 
to $1,500 range barely covers their cost of funds and in fact involves 
them in losses after administrative and bad debt expenses. 
Another disadvantage of a too-steeply sloped ceiling is that it en-
courages credit grantors to fractionalize their grants of credit. Thus 
a consumer who wishes to borrow $900 might be forced to obtain 
three loans for $300, so that lenders can obtain an adequate overall 
rate. On the other hand, if the slope is too gradual, the rates provided 
for small amounts of credit may be so low as to pinch off loans 
under some dollar amount. For example, Maryland has a ceiling on 
size of loan from licensed lenders of $300 and a flat maximum rate 
of three per cent per month. As a result, about three-fourths of the 
dollar volume of loans made by licensed lenders are in the range from 
$200 to $300, while virtually none are made below seventy-five dollars. 
In contrast, licensed lenders in Alabama, operating under a more 
steeply sloped rate ceiling, make about one-fourth of the dollar 
volume of their loans for seventy-five dollars or less.69 
In short, we are confronted with the same problem faced by regu-
lators of taxi fares. An initial charge is made when the customer 
enters the cab. The longer the trip, the more the charge is spread out 
over the miles covered, so that the rate per mile gradually declines 
and then levels off. The larger the initial, or "acquisition charge," 
the higher the return on short trips. If this charge is insufficient, 
68. REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON BANKING AND FINANCE 209 (1964). 
69. See Shay, supra note 58, at 94. 
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drivers will avoid short trips, as anybody who has attempted to take 
a cab from one terminal to another at the Kennedy Airport can 
attest. If the initial charge is too high, drivers will avoid long trips. 
In formulating rate ceilings that decline with the amount of credit 
granted, our objective must be to provide about the same amount of 
credit service in each category that would have been available in a 
free market, while at the same time cutting off unconscionable trans-
actions. No scientific formula can be devised to determine the proper 
slope. Costs of granting credit vary among credit grantors, because 
they provide credit in varying amounts and maturities. Many, such 
as retailers and banks, provide additional goods and services, and the 
costs of providing these items are often shared with the consumer 
credit department. The variations among credit grantors and the 
many instances of joint costs are major barriers to the scientific de-
sign of rate ceilings. The dangers inherent in designing a sloped rate 
ceiling provide one more justification for having "loose" ceilings and 
encouraging competition to set rates below the ceiling. 
IV. SUMMARY 
Existing rate ceilings on consumer credit transactions vary widely 
between cash credit and vendor credit, between closed and open-end 
credit, by type of credit grantors, by type of item financed, and by 
state of jurisdiction. Ceilings on cash credit were established to legal-
ize transactions that could not have been accommodated under most 
usury laws. Rate ceilings on credit sales are of more recent vintage. 
In part they were a response to greater concern about consumers and 
their use of credit; in part they reflect credit grantors' fears that the 
time-price doctrine may not provide a sufficient shield against the 
charge of usury. 
The alleged purpose of rate ceilings has been to achieve a "fair" 
price to consumers, or a "fair" return to credit grantors. But the great 
variations among consumers and credit grantors force us to rely upon 
the effectiveness of shopping by consumers and competition among 
credit grantors to attain a price that is fair to both parties. The best 
that rate ceilings can do is to nip the unconscionable transactions 
which result from a joining of an unwary or desperate consumer and 
an avaricious credit grantor. The worst that rate ceilings can do is 
to distort the market for legal credit, so that consumers are thrust 
into the hands of illegal lenders. 
While rate competition appears to be reasonably effective in 
many types of consumer credit, it would probably be improved to 
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some extent by a rate form of disclosure, especially in transactions 
involving an appreciable dollar amount, where comparison shopping 
is likely to occur. In addition, greater competition among credit 
grantors would be fostered by breaking down the market segmenta-
tions created by present rate ceilings and other regulations. With 
some possible exceptions, the same general ceiling should apply to 
cash and vendor credit, to all types of credit grantors, and to all 
items financed. It may be desirable to provide higher rates in states 
with very low income levels, although the merits of this rest more on 
questions of social values than economics. It does appear necessary 
to set ceilings for closed-end and open-end credit that reflect the 
different methods of calculating finance charges in these two fields. 
To mitigate distortions of the credit market and to allow for the 
infinite variety of credit transactions we must set ceilings, rather than 
rates, and then rely on competition to establish rates charged that 
are generally below the ceiling. Inflationary increases in operating 
costs of credit grantors should be reflected in automatic adjustments 
to the rate ceilings. A rate ceiling that slopes downward in relation 
to size of credit granted is appropriate. The less oppressive the 
ceiling, the less significant is the precise definition of the slope. 
If the formulation of rate ceilings on consumer credit appears to 
be a complex and uncertain task, this analysis will have served its 
purpose. Substitution of governmental fiat for the free operation of 
the market in making price determinations is never easy. 
